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Evaluating Shepard’s, KeyCite, and BCite 
for Case Validation Accuracy*
Paul Hellyer**
This study evaluates and compares how accurately three legal citators (Shepard’s, 
KeyCite, and BCite) identify negative treatment of case law, based on a review of 
357 citing relationships that at least one citator labeled as negative. In this sample, 
Shepard’s and KeyCite missed or mislabeled about one-third of negative citing rela-
tionships, while BCite missed or mislabeled over two-thirds. The citators’ relative 
performance is less clear when examining the most serious citator errors, examples 
of which can be found in all three citators.
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Introduction
¶1 Lexis, Westlaw, and Bloomberg Law are among the most trusted legal 
databases,1 and their citators are one of their most crucial features: Shepard’s on 
Lexis Advance, KeyCite on Westlaw, and BCite on Bloomberg Law. Legal citators 
have a critical role in validating case law by identifying negative treatment from 
other cases. Most importantly, citators should indicate whether a case has been 
cited and overruled by a higher court. Without a reliable citator, lawyers and judges 
 * © Paul Hellyer, 2018.
 ** Reference Librarian, William & Mary Law School. For their comments, I thank Darby Green, 
Scott Mozarsky, and Alexis Trimas Glasberg from Bloomberg Law; Liz Christman from LexisNexis; 
Lori Hedstrom and Leann Blanchfield from Thomson Reuters; James S. Heller; and Benjamin J. 
Keele. This study’s dataset is available from the author upon request.
 1. See, e.g., Kendall F. Svengalis, Legal Information Buyer’s Guide & Reference Manual 
157 (2017 ed.); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Open Access in a Closed Universe: Lexis, Westlaw, Law 
Schools, and the Legal Information Market, 10 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 797, 799, 829 (2006); William R. 
Mills, The Decline and Fall of the Dominant Paradigm: Trustworthiness of Case Reports in the Digital 
Age, 53 N.Y.L.S. L. Rev. 917, 927–28 (2008–09).
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might rely on invalid case law.2 Pronouncements from citators can even sway 
courts and influence the development of law.3 In short, reliable citators are essential 
to the legal profession.
¶2 In their advertisements, Lexis, Westlaw, and Bloomberg Law boast about the 
reliability and convenience of their citators. Lexis claims to follow “rigorous quality 
controls,” and asserts that Shepard’s is “the best way to be confident your case is 
built on the best authority.”4 Westlaw calls KeyCite “[t]he industry’s most accurate, 
up-to-the-minute citation service,” and invites users to “[u]se it to instantly verify 
whether a case, statute, regulation, or administrative decision is good law.”5 Adver-
tising for BCite is less exuberant but confident, with statements such as “Bloomberg 
Law makes it easy to verify that your cases remain good law with . . . BCite.”6
¶3 This study evaluates how accurately Shepard’s, KeyCite, and BCite identify 
negative treatment of case law. The results will likely disappoint anyone who relies 
on these citators. I found highly inconsistent results and egregious mistakes. In this 
study, BCite’s statistical performance is the lowest by a wide margin, but the cita-
tors’ relative performance is less clear when specific citations are examined quali-
tatively. The results for all three citators are troubling. I begin this article with a 
review and analysis of previous comparison studies, followed by a discussion of my 
methodology, statistical results, and a discussion of specific mistakes. As far as I am 
aware, this is the largest statistical comparison study of citator performance for case 
validation, the first statistical comparison study involving BCite, and the first time 
both KeyCite and Shepard’s have been statistically compared with a third citator.
Previous Citator Comparison Studies
¶4 Shepard’s has a long history dating back to 1873, and has been available 
online since th e early 1980s when both Westlaw and Lexis offered it.7 In the 1990s, 
Lexis gained control of Shepard’s; in response, Westlaw developed KeyCite.8 In the 
years following KeyCite’s 1997 debut, several law librarians conducted and pub-
lished comparison tests of the two competing citators.
¶5 Fred Shapiro published the first major comparison study in the April 1998 
issue of Legal Information Alert.9 Shapiro gathered a random sample of 421 federal 
and state cases decided in January 1996, and compared the KeyCite and Shepard’s 
 2. On the importance of citators, see, for example, Gosnell v. Rentokil, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 508, 510 
n.1 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (“It is really inexcusable for any lawyer to fail, as a matter of routine, to Shepardize 
all cited cases.”); Judith D. Fischer, Bareheaded and Barefaced Counsel: Courts React to Unprofession-
alism in Lawyers’ Papers, 31 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1, 9–11 (1997); Ellie Margolis, Surfin’ Safari—Why 
Competent Lawyers Should Research on the Web, 10 Yale J.L. & Tech. 82, 92 (2007).
 3. Joel Heller, Subsequent History Omitted, 5 Calif. L. Rev. Circuit 375, 378 (2014).
 4. Shepard’s Citation Service, LexisNexis, https://www.lexisnexis.com/en-us/products/lexis-
advance/shepards.page [https://perma.cc/36WP-8NWR].
 5. KeyCite on Westlaw Next, Thomson Reuters (2012), http://info.legalsolutions.thomson-
reuters.com/pdf/wln2/l-356347.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4ZH-HY9Y].
 6. Litigation on Bloomberg Law, Bloomberg BNA, https://www.bna.com/litigation-
m57982084299/ [https://perma.cc/AY4R-9XQX].
 7. Laura C. Dabney, Citators: Past, Present, and Future, 27 Legal Reference Servs. Q. 165, 166, 
169 (2008).
 8. Id. at 171–75.
 9. Fred R. Shapiro, KeyCite and Shepard’s—Coverage and Currency of Citations to Recent Cases: 
A Comparative Study, Legal Info. Alert, Apr. 1998, at 1.
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report for each case. He found that KeyCite returned over 50% more citing refer-
ences than Shepard’s, mainly due to better coverage of citations from unreported 
cases and law review articles.10 He also found that KeyCite had an edge in curren-
cy.11 Shapiro did not evaluate the accuracy of either citator. Legal Information Alert 
published a response from Lexis claiming that Shapiro did not use comparable data 
in his citation count comparison. Lexis claimed that Shepard’s listed only citing 
references that had been analyzed by its editors, whereas most of KeyCite’s citing 
references were merely computer-generated, with no analysis. Lexis also claimed 
that KeyCite’s apparent edge in currency was due to KeyCite’s practice of listing cit-
ing references before they had been analyzed.12
¶6 In 1999, Legal Reference Services Quarterly published a second comparison 
study.13 Elizabeth McKenzie discussed the competing claims and counterclaims 
made by Lexis and Westlaw about their respective citators, and then presented the 
results of her own study. McKenzie selected a dozen federal and state cases, and 
compared the Shepard’s and KeyCite reports for each. Like Shapiro, McKenzie 
found that KeyCite retrieved more citing references from unreported cases and law 
review articles, and she also found that KeyCite added more headnote numbers to 
the citing references.14 She praised KeyCite’s innovative “Table of Authorities” and 
depth of treatment features, and predicted that Shepard’s would have to improve in 
response to KeyCite.15
¶7 In 2000, William L. Taylor published a comparison study in Law Library 
Journal,16 which appears to be the most significant statistical comparison study of 
KeyCite and Shepard’s published prior to this article. Taylor began by evaluating the 
completeness and currency of the two citators to see if Shepard’s had closed the gap 
in citation retrieval. Comparing the Shepard’s and KeyCite reports for a random 
sample of 459 state and federal cases decided in April 1997, Taylor found that, as of 
September 1999, there was no longer a significant difference between the citators in 
the number of citing references they retrieved.17 To test currency, Taylor retrieved 
a set of U.S. Courts of Appeals decisions decided just two workdays earlier, and 
identified eighty-seven case citations in these decisions. He then tested how long it 
took for these new case citations to appear in the Shepard’s and KeyCite reports for 
the cited cases. He found that all eighty-seven citations appeared in both citators 
within two workdays of the date of the citing opinion, but that the analyses some-
times took longer. Taylor found that Shepard’s was somewhat faster at adding analy-
ses for unrelated cases, but he was uncertain about the validity of his results since 
he looked at only forty-five citing relationships with analysis in unrelated cases.18
 10. Id. at 3.
 11. Id. at 14.
 12. Shepard’s Response to the Shapiro Comparative Study of Shepard’s and KeyCite, Legal Info. 
Alert, Apr. 1998, at 4.
 13. Elizabeth M. McKenzie, Comparing KeyCite with Shepard’s Online, Legal Reference Servs. 
Q., 1999 No. 3, at 85.
 14. Id. at 92–96.
 15. Id. at 98–99.
 16. William L. Taylor, Comparing KeyCite and Shepard’s for Completeness, Currency, and Accu-
racy, 92 Law Libr. J. 127, 2000 Law Libr. J. 13.
 17. Id. at 129, ¶ 9. Taylor attributed the difference between his results and Shapiro’s to recent 
changes that Shepard’s had made.
 18. Id. at 130–32, ¶¶ 12–20.
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¶8 Taylor went a step further than Shapiro and McKenzie by comparing the 
citators’ case validation accuracy as well, albeit in a limited way. He looked at 146 
citing relationships that at least one of the citators labeled as negative.19 Out of 
these 146, 77 were labeled as negative by both citators, 36 were labeled as negative 
only by Shepard’s, and 33 were labeled as negative only by KeyCite. If we assume 
that all the negative labels were correct, then Shepard’s missed 23% of the negative 
references and KeyCite missed 25%. But why assume all the negative labels were 
correct? Taylor explained this as follows:
It is possible that some of these negative analyses are unique to one system because they 
are mistakes. Looking at the text of each citing opinion, I did find some that I thought were 
incorrectly identified as negative, but I have decided not to interpose my own judgment in 
this very subjective area.20
¶9 I agree with Taylor that this area can sometimes be subjective, so I can 
understand his reluctance to use his own judgment. But his reticence has draw-
backs. Each time a citator creates a false negative label, Taylor’s method gives it 
credit for its mistake, while penalizing the other citator for not making the same 
mistake. It’s possible that one citator has a greater tendency to create false negative 
labels, which would invalidate the comparison. It’s also plausible that some of the 
discrepancies between the citators resulted from reasonable differences of opinion 
in interpreting ambiguous treatment, but Taylor did not make any attempt to sepa-
rate reasonable differences of opinion from clear mistakes. For these reasons, it’s 
possible that the real error rates for one or both citators are much lower than Tay-
lor’s estimate.
¶10 On the other hand, Taylor might have significantly undercounted the mis-
takes in one or both citators. Taylor only considered whether treatment was labeled 
as negative; he did not consider conflicts between the descriptive phrases that 
Shepard’s and KeyCite applied. If Shepard’s says a case was “overruled,” while Key-
Cite says it was merely “distinguished,” it’s unlikely that they could both be consid-
ered correct. Second, Taylor did not count any negative treatment that was missed 
by both Shepard’s and KeyCite. If Taylor had been able to compare results from a 
third citator, he might have identified additional errors.
¶11 Lexis and Westlaw both published responses to Taylor’s study and, not 
surprisingly, their criticism focused on Taylor’s method of determining accuracy. 
In an appendix to his article, Taylor listed the citing relationships that had been 
labeled as negative by one citator, but not the other. Both Lexis and Westlaw made 
good use of this list. Jane Morris, writing on behalf of Lexis, offered two examples 
of “errors” attributed to Shepard’s, which were in fact false negative labels generated 
by KeyCite.21 Not to be outdone, Westlaw commissioned an independent panel of 
experts to review all the citing relationships in Taylor’s appendix and determine 
which citator deserved the blame for each discrepancy. Dan Dabney, writing on 
behalf of Westlaw, announced that the panel had found that in this sample, KeyCite 
 19. Id. at 133, ¶ 23. Taylor looked at two different samples of citing relationships; I’m combining 
his numbers here.
 20. Id. at 133 n.17, ¶ 22 n.17.
 21. Jane W. Morris, A Response to Taylor’s Comparison of Shepard’s and KeyCite, 92 Law Libr. J. 
143, 143–144, 2000 Law Libr. J. 14, ¶¶ 4–6.
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had a slight edge in accuracy over Shepard’s: thirty-five correct entries for KeyCite, 
versus thirty-three for Shepard’s.22
¶12 Westlaw’s use of an independent panel of experts is intriguing. Dabney 
revealed that the panel members frequently disagreed with each other: they reached 
unanimous agreement only about half the time, and were split three to two on eigh-
teen out of sixty-eight citing relationships.23 But Dabney’s article left many of the 
details unclear, making it hard to determine why the panel members disagreed so 
frequently. Apparently, Westlaw asked the panel members to give a simple yes or no 
answer on whether each citation should be labeled as negative.24 Dabney did not say 
whether the panel members were able to confer with each other, nor if they were 
given any guidance. It’s unclear whether each panel member came up with their 
own working definition of “negative treatment.” But Dabney’s conclusion is clear 
enough—he believes that citation analysis is a subjective process. He wrote:
Perhaps the most salient point to take from this exercise is that one should not rely too 
much on the history judgments supplied by the editors for either system. Each system 
missed history tags that were correctly identified by the other, and each applied some tags 
that were properly omitted by the other.
 But, while both systems could undoubtedly do somewhat better in applying history 
tags, it is not to be expected that they can always anticipate the judgments of individual legal 
researchers. If individual researchers do not agree among themselves, there is no way that 
any system can always agree with all of them. Thus, while history tags are of immense assis-
tance to the legal researcher, they should not be relied upon exclusively. Careful researchers 
should also examine citations that do not have negative tags.25 
¶13 Westlaw’s advertising for KeyCite does not reflect Dabney’s advice.26
¶14 In the seventeen years since Taylor’s article was published, there have been 
no comparable follow-up studies that I’m aware of, although some of the later cita-
tor commentaries have been interesting.27 Perhaps the most significant develop-
 22. Dan Dabney, Another Response to Taylor’s Comparison of KeyCite and Shepard’s, 92 Law Libr. 
J. 381, 383, 2000 Law Libr. J. 33, tbl. 1. Careful readers may notice a slight discrepancy between Tay-
lor’s article and Dabney’s, which results from an error in Taylor’s article. In the main text of his article, 
Taylor wrote that there were a total of sixty-nine negative labels that were unique to either KeyCite 
or Shepard’s: thirty-three for KeyCite, and thirty-six for Shepard’s. Taylor, supra note 16, at 133, ¶ 23. 
But Dabney referred to only sixty-eight unique negative labels. This is because Taylor listed only 
sixty-eight unique negative labels in his appendix: thirty-two for KeyCite, and thirty-six for Shepard’s. 
Taylor either omitted a citing relationship from his appendix or miscounted when writing his article.
 23. Dabney, supra note 22, at 384, tbl. 2.
 24. Dabney did not say this explicitly, but he did not list anything other than simple binary 
responses.
 25. Dabney, supra note 22, at 384–85, ¶¶ 19–20.
 26. See KeyCite on WestlawNext, supra note 5.
 27. In 2003, Alan Wolf and Lynn Wishart examined an inherent shortcoming in both Shepard’s 
and KeyCite: they miss important new legal authorities that don’t cite the target case. Alan Wolf & 
Lynn Wishart, Shepard’s and KeyCite Are Flawed (Or Maybe It’s You), N.Y. St. B.J., Sept. 2003, at 24. 
This is an important problem often overlooked by novice researchers. For example, if a state legisla-
ture passes a new statute that supersedes an existing case, the statute itself won’t appear in the case’s 
citator report because the statute doesn’t cite the case. Although we can’t expect a citator to pick up 
non-citations, the databases must take some blame for their misleading advertising. Contrary to what 
their advertising suggests, Shepard’s, KeyCite, and BCite don’t tell you if a case is still good law—they 
merely tell you about the sources that cited it. More recently, in 2013 Susan Nevelow Mart found that 
Shepard’s outperformed KeyCite in identifying relevant headnotes. Susan Nevelow Mart, The Case for 
Curation: The Relevance of Digest and Citator Results in Westlaw and Lexis, 32 Legal Reference Servs. 
Q. 13, 41–42 (2013). In 2016, Aaron Kirschenfeld compared the descriptive phrases that KeyCite and 
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ment since Taylor’s article is the appearance of Bloomberg Law and its citator 
BCite, which launched in late 2009.28 I am not aware of any significant comparison 
tests involving BCite.29 Part of this article’s purpose is to determine whether BCite 
is comparable to Shepard’s and KeyCite for case validation, but perhaps more 
importantly, the addition of a third citator allows for a more thorough assessment 
of all three citators.
¶15 Designing a citator accuracy test is a difficult task. Taylor tried a minimalist 
approach, for which he was criticized. But Taylor’s critics ran into problems of their 
own. Westlaw went to the trouble of commissioning an independent study, only to 
find that their panel members frequently disagreed with each other. Westlaw’s Dan 
Dabney seemed ready to give up on the idea of comparing accuracy, instead offer-
ing his conclusion that citation analysis is a matter of opinion.
¶16 Based on my own experience with the study presented here, I concede that 
citation analysis is partly subjective. There are two key reasons for this. First, courts 
sometimes use ambiguous language when discussing other cases, sometimes delib-
erately. This creates ambiguity in a citator’s underlying data, and ambiguity will 
always be open to different interpretations. Second, different researchers may have 
different ideas on what “negative treatment” means, not to mention more specific 
terms like “distinguished” or “criticized.”
¶17 Nonetheless, I believe it’s possible to design a reasonably objective com-
parison of citator accuracy. In the vast majority of the citing relationships I saw, the 
courts expressed themselves clearly, and if the underlying data are reasonably clear, 
there’s no reason why citators and citator comparisons can’t also be reasonably clear 
and accurate. To illustrate, let’s consider again the independent study that Westlaw 
commissioned in response to Taylor’s article. At first glance, it may seem that the 
panel members often disagreed on what the citing cases said. But some of those 
apparent conflicts may have been due to flaws in the way Westlaw designed the 
comparison test.
¶18 Westlaw apparently asked each panelist for a simple yes or no answer on 
whether each citing relationship was negative. But Westlaw could have offered a 
third option—it could have allowed the panelists to say that a citing relationship 
was ambiguous. It could be that in many of the apparent conflicts, the panelists 
would have agreed with each other that the citing relationship was ambiguous. If 
Westlaw had excluded these ambiguous relationships from the results, no doubt 
they would have found a higher rate of agreement on the remaining relationships. 
Alternatively, Westlaw could have excluded citing relationships where the panelists 
split three to two, and based its comparison on the remaining citing relationships. 
Either way, it’s possible to create a more objective comparison test by filtering out 
Shepard’s applied to negative citing references. Aaron S. Kirschenfeld, Yellow Flag Fever: Describing 
Negative Legal Precedent in Citators, 108 Law Libr. J. 77, 2016 Law Libr. J. 4. Due to a small sample 
size, he did not come to any conclusions about which citator was more accurate. Id. at 91–92, ¶ 40.
 28. Robert J. Ambrogi, Can It Be a Contender? Bloomberg Law, Or. St. Bar Bull., Feb./Mar. 2010, 
at 15.
 29. I am aware of two very limited comparison tests involving BCite, Shepard’s, and KeyCite. 
Neither produced any statistically valid results. Carole A. Levitt & Mark Rosch, Are All Citator 
Services Created Equal?, Internet for Lawyers (2012), http://www.netforlawyers.com/content/
caselaw-citators-comparison-Google%20Scholar-Fastcase-Casemaker-LexisNexis-WestlawNext-
Bloomberg-0059 [https://perma.cc/97K8-WW8Q]; Michael Robak, The Bloomberg Citator: A First 
Look at BLAW’s Citation Function, AALL Spectrum, July 2009, at 24.
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unreliable data. Some citing relationships are clear while others are hopelessly 
muddled; we shouldn’t treat both types of citing relationships the same way in a 
citator comparison test.
¶19 Furthermore, it’s not clear that Westlaw supplied the panel members with 
any definition of “negative treatment” or that Westlaw allowed the panel members 
to confer with each other on a definition. Even when a citing relationship is clear 
and two researchers read it the same way, they may apply conflicting labels if they 
don’t agree on what the labels mean. In any comparison test, it’s essential for all the 
testers to share clear and consistent understandings of what the labels mean, and to 
disclose these understandings when publishing their results.
¶20 Finally, it’s not clear that the conflicts between Westlaw’s panel members 
resulted from differences of opinion, rather than simple mistakes. Even when a cit-
ing relationship is clear, it may be hard to spot—sometimes I found a key phrase 
buried in a footnote, or sometimes the relevant discussion came a few paragraphs 
after the citation. If the panel members had been allowed to confer with each other 
at the end of the process, they might have been able to resolve many of their con-
flicts simply by pointing out the relevant passages to each other.
¶21 In the end, I expect it would be rare for two expert researchers to view the 
same citing relationship, point out the relevant passages to each other, agree that the 
language is unambiguous, and still disagree on what the citing court meant to say. 
There is more room for disagreement on how a citing relationship should be 
labeled, but a citator can and should explain any labels to end users through detailed 
definitions. In a comparison test, labels that are different but comparable can both 
be considered correct.
¶22 I’ve tried to improve on the accuracy of previous studies, but in the end no 
evaluation will be entirely free from subjectivity. So that readers may judge my work 
for themselves, I offer a detailed description of my methodology and many exam-
ples of the errors I perceived in the citators.
Methodology: Designing a Citator Comparison Test
¶23 In this study, I evaluate how accurately and thoroughly the citators identify 
negative citing references, from the perspective of a typical user. My “typical user” 
perspective centers on the needs of practicing lawyers, but it does not involve a 
particular jurisdiction or a particular legal problem. The question is whether a cit-
ing reference would negatively impact a lawyer’s reliance on a case in any jurisdic-
tion for any purpose. If a citator fails to identify any such negative treatment, I 
count this failure against the citator, regardless of whether the citator followed its 
own procedures. This explains my basic approach.30
¶24 As a starting point, I used Lexis to retrieve all seventy-three published deci-
sions of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals from January 1984.31 I selected the 
 30. It might be useful to separately evaluate how well the citators follow their own procedures, 
but my knowledge of the citators’ behind-the-scenes work is incomplete. Only the database providers 
could fully and accurately evaluate how well the citators follow their internal procedures.
 31. To retrieve these cases, I used the search query date = 1/1984 in Lexis’s database of Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals cases, and then used the filter option for reported cases. This yielded seventy-six 
cases, three of which were false hits. Two of the false hits were cases that the court withdrew prior 
to final publication (Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 732 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1984), and Piatt v. 
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Ninth Circuit because of its reputation for a high reversal rate.32 In its October 1984 
term, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed twenty-eight Ninth Circuit cases and 
reversed them twenty-seven times.33 I didn’t design this article to evaluate the 
Ninth Circuit, but in any case my choice did not disappoint: as of mid-2017, 
according to the citators, these seventy-three Ninth Circuit cases have garnered a 
total of 357 negative citing references from other courts. These citing references are 
the basis for this comparison study.
¶25 Before going any further, I would like to stress that this study is not limited 
to results from January 1984, nor is it limited to Ninth Circuit cases. The seventy-
three Ninth Circuit cases are merely a starting point. The relevant treatment comes 
from the citing cases, which date from 1984 to 2017, and come from a variety of 
courts. Federal cases predominate among the citing cases, which might skew the 
results somewhat if one or more citators handle federal cases with greater or lesser 
care than state cases. Otherwise, the results presented here should be representative 
of the citators’ overall validation performance.
¶26 After I had identified the seventy-three Ninth Circuit cases using Lexis, I 
skimmed or read portions of each case so that I understood its subject matter, and 
downloaded its Shepard’s, KeyCite, and BCite reports. The 357 citing cases I exam-
ined include each citing case that at least one of the three citators identified as 
negative, not including negative treatment from administrative decisions. All the 
citing cases I examined were from domestic courts (state, federal, and territorial), 
including both published and unpublished opinions. All three citators place citing 
cases into separate categories for “history” (i.e., other cases from the same course 
of litigation) and unrelated cases, but I make no such distinction and treat all nega-
tive case law treatment the same way, regardless of what category it comes from.34
¶27 For BCite, I counted as negative any citing relationships labeled as “distin-
guished,” “criticized,” “superseded by statute,” “prior overruling,” “overruled in 
part,” or “overruled.” For KeyCite, I counted as negative any citing relationships on 
the “Negative Treatment” tab. For Shepard’s, I counted as negative any citing rela-
tionships with a red, orange, or yellow square, as well as citing relationships labeled 
as “Among Conflicting Authorities Noted In” (ACAN).35 Throughout this paper, I 
refer to all of these indicators as “negative.” For each citing relationship that I stud-
MacDougall, 723 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1984)), and another was a case listed twice by Lexis, the second 
time with a different docket number and no Shepard’s results (EEOC v. Borden’s, Inc., 724 F.2d 1390 
(9th Cir. 1984)). I used only the first entry for Borden’s (the one with Shepard’s results).
 32. See, e.g., Marybeth Herald, Reversed, Vacated, and Split: The Supreme Court, the Ninth Cir-
cuit, and the Congress, 77 Or. L. Rev. 405 (1998); Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, A Decade of Reversal: The 
Ninth Circuit’s Record in the Supreme Court Since October Term 2000, 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 1557 
(2010); Kevin M. Scott, Supreme Court Reversals of the Ninth Circuit, 48 Ariz. L. Rev. 341 (2006); 
Stephen J. Wermiel, Exploring the Myths About the Ninth Circuit, 48 Ariz. L. Rev. 355 (2006).
 33. Wermiel, supra note 32, at 357.
 34. BCite further separates unrelated cases into two tabs, “Case Analysis” and “Citing Docu-
ments.” See Product Help & Walkthrough: BCite, Bloomberg Law, https://www.bna.com/bcite/ 
[https://perma.cc/W4N6-ESQ5]. The cases on the “Citing Documents” tab have no treatment sym-
bols or descriptions, and it’s not clear if they are analyzed at all. In this study, I make no distinction 
between the two tabs. I count all failures to appropriately label a case, regardless of whether the case 
is on the “Case Analysis” or “Citing Documents” tab.
 35. Shepard’s considers ACAN to be neutral treatment, but the ACAN label is comparable to a 
negative label on KeyCite, so I decided to include ACAN labels in this study for purposes of compari-
son. See infra ¶¶ 42–44.
457EVALUATING SHEPARD’S, KEYCITE, AND BCITE FOR CASE VALIDATION ACCURACYVol. 110:4  [2018-20]
ied, I recorded the descriptive word or phrase that each citator applied (for example, 
“distinguished by” or “disagreement recognized by”).36
¶28 I gathered the raw data for this study between April 25 and June 6, 2017. 
For each of the seventy-three Ninth Circuit cases, I always retrieved reports from 
all three citators on the same day, so that no citator would receive an unfair advan-
tage due to timing. Prior to the publication of this article, I shared my findings with 
the database providers, and in response they have already made changes to their 
citator reports. I don’t take into account any changes to the reports after I down-
loaded them, so this article does not necessarily reflect the citators’ current 
content.
¶29 For each of the 357 citing relationships that I examined, I retrieved the cit-
ing case, read the relevant passages, and made my own judgment as to how the 
citing case treated the cited Ninth Circuit case.37 If I felt that reasonable people 
might disagree on whether a citing relationship was negative, I recorded it as 
ambiguous. In these situations, I did not treat any citator as right or wrong. For 
example, in Fyffe v. Heckler,38 a disability benefits case, a U.S. District Court cited 
the Ninth Circuit’s Kail v. Heckler39 in an ambiguous way. The district court wrote:
Fyffe argues that his objectively identified psychological disorder is “severe” as defined in 
the regulations. He then argues that the existence of this severe non-exertional impair-
ment absolutely precludes a directed denial of disability pursuant to the grids [vocational 
guidelines]. There is some support for Fyffe’s argument. See, e.g., Kail v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 
1496, 1498 (9th Cir.1984); McCoy v. Schweiker, supra (where non-exertional impairments 
are present, the grids may serve only as guidelines); Roberts v. Schweiker, 667 F.2d 1143 (4th 
Cir.1981) (recourse must be had to evidence other than the grids). Here, however, Fyffe’s 
real argument is not with the ALJ’s reliance on the grids, but rather is with the ALJ’s finding 
that Fyffe’s non-exertional impairment is not so severe as to preclude sedentary, unskilled 
work.40
The court did not cite Kail again, and ruled against the plaintiff. How did the court 
treat Kail? It seems clear that the court distinguished McCoy and Roberts, and by 
implication it seems to have distinguished Kail as well, but it’s hard to be certain 
because the district court didn’t include any parenthetical for Kail. The district 
court said nothing explicit about Kail, except that it provided “some support for 
Fyffe’s argument.” According to Shepard’s, Fyffe distinguished Kail, but according to 
KeyCite and BCite, Kail did not receive any negative treatment here. I tend to agree 
with Shepard’s, but I recognize some room for reasonable difference of opinion. I 
marked this citing relationship as ambiguous, so that none of the citators are 
credited or penalized.41
 36. I used abbreviations in my data, such as “D” for “distinguished by” and “DR” for “disagree-
ment recognized by.”
 37. To improve the accuracy of my results, I reviewed all the citing cases a second time, a few 
months after my initial review. I recorded my own judgments again without looking at my initial judg-
ments, and then compared my initial set of judgments with my second set of judgments. I reviewed for 
a third time the citing relationships where my judgment was inconsistent and produced a corrected 
set of results.
 38. 580 F. Supp. 310 (D. Ariz. 1984).
 39. 722 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir. 1984).
 40. Fyffe, 580 F. Supp. at 314.
 41. Another example of ambiguous treatment can be seen in Ferguson v. Park City Mobile Homes, 
No. 89 C 1909, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11010 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 1989). In Ferguson, a U.S. District Court 
in Illinois agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Brothers v. First Leasing, 724 F.2d 789 (9th Cir. 
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¶30 For each citing relationship that was not ambiguous, I decided whether the 
relationship was negative. If a citing relationship was negative, but a citator failed 
to identify it as such, I marked this as a failure. These failures can occur in one of 
two ways: (i) failing to put a negative label on a negative case, or (ii) omitting a 
negative case altogether. In my records, I distinguished between the two types of 
situations. I sometimes refer to the first type of situation as “mislabeling,” but to be 
more precise, some of these cases have no analysis label at all.42 I also tracked nega-
tive labels that citators applied to citing relationships that were in fact positive or 
neutral; in the results section of this article, I report these instances separately.
¶31 My understanding of “negative” treatment means any treatment that invali-
dates the cited case in any jurisdiction, casts doubt on its validity in any jurisdic-
tion, criticizes its reasoning, and/or limits its application. It’s not uncommon for a 
court to treat a cited case both positively and negatively in the same opinion. In my 
view, any negative treatment needs to be labeled as such, regardless of whether it is 
mixed with positive treatment. Ideally, a citator should include both positive and 
negative labels for the same citing case where appropriate, with specific pin cites. 
Shepard’s has this capability, but KeyCite and BCite do not. If a citing case gives a 
mix of positive and negative treatment, I expect a citator to apply a negative label, 
but in order to treat all three citators comparably, I overlook any failure to provide 
a positive label in addition to the negative label.43
¶32 In a few instances, I noticed that a citator omitted a positive or ambiguous 
citing case from its list of citing cases. Positive omissions would come to my atten-
tion only if another citator mislabeled the positive case as negative. Although I 
recorded these positive and ambiguous omissions when I found them, I did not 
count these omissions as errors since I’m not judging the citators’ overall recall 
performance—I’m judging only their performance in identifying negative 
treatment.
1984), that a lease could be a form of credit covered by the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. But at the 
same time, the District Court disagreed with part of the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning. Ferguson, 1989 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11010, at *7 (“While this Court does not follow Brothers’s analysis—the Ninth Cir-
cuit reasoned that the ECOA incorporates the proscriptions of the TILA as amended by the CLA—it 
agrees, based on what has been presented to the Court, that the ECOA can apply to this transaction.”). 
In effect, the District Court merely concurred with the result reached by the Ninth Circuit. In the 
KeyCite report for Brothers, Westlaw labeled Ferguson as “not followed by.” Shepard’s did not label 
Ferguson as negative, while BCite missed Ferguson altogether. I tend to agree that Ferguson is negative, 
although I would have described it as “criticized by.” But it could be argued that declining to follow 
a line of reasoning is not the same as criticism, and that the departure in reasoning is outweighed by 
the agreed result. Seeing room for reasonable difference of opinion, I marked this citing relationship 
as ambiguous.
 42. It’s a worse mistake to put a distinctly positive label on a negative case than no analysis label 
at all, but the different citators don’t have comparable ways of handling non-negative cases. KeyCite 
doesn’t use positive or neutral analysis labels at all. In this article, I treat citing references that have no 
analysis label as being comparable to citing references with a positive or neutral label.
 43. For example, in Marchese v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 734 F.2d 414 (9th Cir. 1984), the 
Ninth Circuit cited its earlier opinion in Amaro v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1984). 
The Marchese court applied Amaro to one of the plaintiff ’s claims, 734 F.2d at 421, but held that 
Amaro was distinguishable with respect to another claim, id. at 423. Although Shepard’s can label 
a citing case as both negative and positive, the Shepard’s report for Amaro labeled Marchese only as 
“distinguished by.” KeyCite and BCite listed Marchese as a citing case, but did not label it as negative 
treatment. I marked Shepard’s as correct, and KeyCite and BCite as incorrect. 
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¶33 All three citators do more than just mark certain citing references as negative. 
They also apply descriptive words or phrases to specify the type of negative treat-
ment, such as “distinguished by” or “overruled.” These descriptions are important, as 
some forms of negative treatment are more severe than others, and users may choose 
to examine only certain types of negative treatment. I evaluated the descriptive labels 
that the citators applied to negative citing relationships, and counted any that were 
plainly incorrect.44 I allowed for some difference of opinion, so that two different 
descriptive labels applied by two different citators might both be considered correct. 
For example, in Chance Management, Inc. v. South Dakota,45 the Eighth Circuit said 
the following about a Ninth Circuit opinion: “We are not entirely persuaded by the 
reasoning in Western Oil and Gas; however, even if we were to agree, this case is 
different.”46 The court went on to describe how its case was different, but it made no 
critical remarks about the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning. Shepard’s labeled this citing 
relationship as “distinguished by,” while KeyCite labeled it as “called into doubt by.” I 
think that Shepard’s label is more accurate, but some users might feel that the phrase 
“we are not entirely persuaded by the reasoning” warrants the more negative label 
applied by KeyCite. Allowing for reasonable difference of opinion, I marked both 
labels as correct. BCite didn’t label this as negative, which I counted as a failure.
¶34 Sometimes different parts of a citing case engage in different types of nega-
tive treatment. This creates a potential problem in the underlying data, but not 
necessarily any ambiguity. Ideally, a citator should accurately describe all the appli-
cable types of negative treatment. Shepard’s has this capability, but I didn’t notice 
any citing cases in KeyCite or BCite that had more than one negative descriptive 
label. At a minimum, citators need to alert users to the most serious type of negative 
treatment. Where more than one type of negative treatment is involved, I accept as 
correct any descriptive phrase that correctly describes the most serious type. For 
example, in Williams v. Baltimore County, the U.S. District Court in Maryland both 
criticized and distinguished a Ninth Circuit opinion.47 Shepard’s handled this the 
ideal way, by applying both “criticized by” and “distinguished by” labels. KeyCite 
and BCite labeled Williams as distinguishing only, which I counted as failures. If 
KeyCite or BCite had labeled Williams as “criticized by,” but not “distinguished by,” 
I would have marked them as correct. 
¶35 Each citator has its own standardized list of descriptive terms and phrases 
that it applies to citing cases.48 Many terms and phrases are common to all three 
 44. For my statistical comparison, I didn’t evaluate KeyCite’s “most negative treatment” label, 
which is designed to highlight the single most negative reference for a case. See Kim Ellenberg, West-
law Next Tip of the Week: Checking Cases with KeyCite, Legal Solutions Blog (June 11, 2012), http://
blog.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/legal-research/reference-attorney-tips/westlaw-next-tip-of 
-the-week-checking-cases-with-keycite/ [https://perma.cc/7ZLT-4GGJ]. I didn’t mark any “most 
negative” labels as wrong partly because Shepard’s and BCite lack a comparable feature, and partly 
because a mistake in a “most negative” label usually results from mistakes in other labels in the same 
KeyCite report. Counting “most negative” labels as wrong would subject KeyCite to a form of double-
counting not applied to Shepard’s or BCite.
 45. 97 F.3d 1107 (8th Cir. 1996).
 46. Id. at 1114 (citing Western Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Cory, 726 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1984)).
 47. No. 13-03445, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32124, at *40–42 (D. Md. March 11, 2016) (citing 
Wrighten v. Metro. Hosps., Inc., 726 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir. 1984)). 
 48. LexisNexis, Shepard’s Signal Indicators and Treatments 2 (2016), https://www.lexisnexis.
com/pdf/lexis-advance/Shepards-Signal-Indicators-and-analysis-phrases-Final.pdf [https://perma.
cc/Y2CH-9H8J]; Thomson Reuters, KeyCite on Thomson Reuters Westlaw 2, 4 (2016), https://
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citators, but there are some differences. Minor differences are easily harmonized. 
For example, Shepard’s uses the phrase “questioned by,” while KeyCite uses the 
comparable phrase “called into doubt by.” Wherever the phrase “questioned by” is 
correct, I also consider the phrase “called into doubt by” to be correct. But some-
times a label in one citator has no counterpart in another. If a citator is unable to 
correctly identify relevant negative treatment because it has no appropriate label it 
can apply, I count this as a failure.
¶36 For example, in In re Schwartz, a bankruptcy court in the Third Circuit 
declined to apply a Ninth Circuit decision (Matthews) because it directly conflicted 
with a Third Circuit case (Pristas).49 The District Court merely stated: “Although 
Mathews [sic] and the numerous other cases provide a tenable basis for the debtors’ 
stance, they are in direct conflict with Pristas. We are, of course, bound by Pristas.”50 
KeyCite correctly labeled this treatment as “not followed,” while Shepard’s misla-
beled it as “criticized by” and BCite mislabeled it as positive treatment. Shepard’s 
and BCite do not appear to have any label equivalent to “not followed.” It’s possible 
that the editor at Shepard’s chose the label “criticized by” because it was the best 
available label in Shepard’s. But the Schwartz court did not criticize the Ninth Cir-
cuit, according to any reasonable understanding of the term “criticized.”51 On the 
contrary, the Schwartz court acknowledged that Matthews offers a “tenable basis” 
and that it aligns with “numerous other cases.” From the perspective of the user, the 
Shepard’s label is wrong. It makes no difference to the user whether Shepard’s mis-
take resulted from an individual editor’s decision or from a broader design problem 
in Shepard’s list of descriptive terms and phrases. Likewise, BCite’s lack of any 
negative label here is a validation failure from the user’s perspective. For a lawyer 
in the Third Circuit, In re Schwartz indicates that Matthews is not good law, yet 
BCite applies no negative label.
¶37 BCite’s list of descriptive terms and phrases is significantly shorter than the 
lists offered by KeyCite and Shepard’s, which puts BCite at some disadvantage in 
this comparison study.52 I do not automatically count these missing labels against 
BCite, but rather I verify in each instance whether the labels applied by the other 
citators are accurate and relevant to the typical user. For example, if KeyCite 
applied a “not followed” label to a citing reference that did follow the cited case, I 
would mark KeyCite’s label as incorrect and credit BCite for having no negative 
label. If KeyCite applied a “not followed” label to an ambiguous citing reference, no 
lscontent.westlaw.com/images/content/KeyCite%20on%20Westlaw.pdf [https://perma.cc/KR66-
C3AY]; Bloomberg Law Citator, https://www.bna.com/btaccitator/ [https://perma.cc/4L47-6EBF]. I 
found a few additional terms and phrases in Shepard’s and KeyCite results that are not included in 
their published lists, but they don’t vary widely.
 49. 52 B.R. 314, 316–17 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985) (citing Pristas v. Landaus of Plymouth, Inc., 742 
F.2d 797 (3rd Cir. 1984), and Matthews v. Transamerica Fin. Servs., 724 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1984)).
 50. Id. at 317.
 51. In a user guide, Lexis explains its use of the term “criticized,” but the explanation reflects the 
ordinary meaning of the word. See LexisNexis, Shepard’s Signal Indicators and Treatments, supra note 
48. I found no instances in which a citator’s user guide conflicted with common sense.
 52. The only labels in BCite that might be considered negative are “distinguished,” “criticized,” 
“superseded by statute,” “prior overruling,” “overruled in part,” and “overruled.” See Bloomberg Law 
Citator, supra note 48. 
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citator would be credited or penalized. In their comments to me, Bloomberg Law 
asserted that I am unfairly penalizing BCite for having a shorter list of labels.53 
¶38 The term “distinguished” appears to be the most common negative treat-
ment label in all three citators, and requires some clarification. As I understand the 
term in this context, a “distinguishing” case reaches a different outcome or applies 
a different rule of law as compared to the cited case because of factual differences 
(procedural or substantive) between the two cases.54 This is a form of negative 
treatment because it may limit the scope of the cited case. By contrast, a citing case 
that points out a factual difference in the cited case, but nonetheless applies the 
same rule of law and reaches the same outcome, is not what I consider a “distin-
guishing” case. On the contrary, it’s a positive reference that reaffirms the cited case 
and perhaps even extends it.
¶39 A citation in United States v. Gleave55 illustrates this distinction. Gleave 
pointed out differences between its fact pattern and the Ninth Circuit’s United States 
v. Snowadzki,56 yet Gleave did not distinguish Snowadzki. Both cases found that an 
informant was not acting as a government agent under a Fourth Amendment 
analysis, so that evidence seized by the informant could be admitted. Gleave 
described the factual differences as follows:
In this case, the facts indicating government involvement in the alleged burglary of Knoll’s 
office are less than in Snowadzki. Unlike Snowadzki, in this case there is no evidence that 
the government knew of a potential seizure before it took place and no rewards to private 
parties were mentioned.57
Here, Gleave is pointing out that its defendant has an even weaker case than the 
defendant in Snowadzki, who also lost on this point. Gleave is in no way a negative 
reference for Snowadzki, yet KeyCite labeled it as “distinguished by.” I marked 
KeyCite’s label as incorrect. Shepard’s and BCite treated Gleave as a positive 
reference, which I marked as correct.
¶40 Some readers may have a broader view of the term “distinguished,” but in 
the context of citators it would be problematic to group together both positive and 
negative treatment under the same “distinguished” label. Labels should aid users in 
differentiating between types of treatment. Moreover, labeling positive cases as 
“distinguished” would conflict with the structure of Shepard’s and KeyCite, and is 
inconsistent with the data I gathered for BCite. Shepard’s assigns any distinguishing 
treatment a yellow caution sign (which indicates possible negative treatment), and 
KeyCite puts any distinguishing treatment on the “Negative Treatment” tab. From 
the user’s perspective, Gleave’s appearance in a negative category would seem to be 
a mistake. In BCite, the negative nature of the “distinguished” label is less clear to 
 53. See infra ¶ 75.
 54. KeyCite’s published definition of “distinguished” matches my own, while the definitions 
published by Shepard’s and BCite are consistent with mine, but open to interpretation. See Thomson 
Reuters, KeyCite on Thomson Reuters Westlaw, supra note 48 (“Distinguished: There is a difference 
in facts, procedural posture, or law between the two cases that compels the citing court to reach a 
different result than the cited case”); LexisNexis, Shepard’s Signal Indicators and Treatments, supra 
note 48 (“Distinguished by: the citing case differs from the case you are Shepardizing, either involving 
dissimilar facts or requiring a different application of the law”); Bloomberg Law Citator, supra note 48 
(“Distinguished: . . . one or more courts differentiate this opinion on the law or the facts”).
 55. 786 F. Supp. 258 (W.D.N.Y. 1992).
 56. 723 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1984).
 57. Gleave, 786 F. Supp. at 290 n.20. 
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the user.58 In their comments to me, Bloomberg Law stated that their “distin-
guished” label is not necessarily negative.59 However, BCite’s actual practice was to 
apply no distinguishing label to any of the nine citing references like Gleave in my 
dataset. Although BCite’s policy might pose a problem for future comparison tests, 
I regard it as a moot point in this comparison test.
¶41 Another important distinction is that “distinguished” doesn’t mean the 
same as “distinguishable.” Any case is distinguishable under the right circum-
stances. The purpose of a citator is not to tell us that a case is distinguishable, but 
rather to tell us which cases have distinguished it. This may seem like an obvious 
point, but the citators sometimes disregard it. For example, in Vic Wertz Distribut-
ing Co. v. Teamsters Local 1038,60 the court noted that George Day Construction Co. 
v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters61 is “distinguishable from the typical case,” and 
then in the next paragraph, it stated that its own case is like George Day—in other 
words, not like the typical case.62 Curiously, both BCite and KeyCite labeled Vic 
Wertz as distinguishing George Day. But surely users would expect the “distin-
guished by” label to refer to the relationship between Vic Wertz and George Day—
not to the relationship between George Day and a nameless “typical case.”63 I 
marked BCite and KeyCite as incorrect.64 Shepard’s labeled Vic Wertz as a positive 
reference, which I marked as correct. 
¶42 Shepard’s “Among Conflicting Authorities Noted In” (ACAN) label pres-
ents a puzzle. Shepard’s considers ACAN to be neutral treatment, but KeyCite has 
a similar descriptive phrase called “Disagreement Recognized By” (DR), which it 
treats as negative. BCite does not have a comparable label. Both Shepard’s and Key-
Cite apply these labels to cases that say the cited case is in conflict with other cases. 
For example, in Burds v. Union Pacific Corp.,65 the Eighth Circuit noted a circuit 
split involving the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Amaro v. Continental Can Co.66 The 
Eighth Circuit said that Amaro conflicted with opinions from the Seventh and 
Eleventh Circuits, but the Burds court did not decide which side to take.67 Shepard’s 
labeled this as ACAN (neutral treatment), while KeyCite labeled it as DR (negative 
 58. In BCite, cases that have been distinguished can’t have a positive composite analysis label. 
From this, I inferred that the “distinguished” label in BCite is distinct from positive treatment. But 
unlike Shepard’s and KeyCite, BCite’s interface does not explicitly place distinguished references in a 
negative category.
 59. Letter from Darby J. Green, Commercial Director of Litigation & Bankruptcy, Bloomberg 
Law, to author (July 10, 2018) (on file with author). 
 60. 898 F.2d 1136 (6th Cir. 1990).
 61. 722 F.2d 1471 (9th Cir. 1984).
 62. Vic Wertz Distributing Co., 898 F.2d at 1140.
 63. A citator might use a label such as “distinguishing recognized by,” similar to the label “over-
ruling recognized by,” to cover situations where a court refers to a relationship between the cited case 
and some other case. It’s not clear whether such a label should be considered negative or whether it 
would be useful to users. But I have never seen such a label in any of the citators.
 64. On this point, I don’t believe the database providers and I have any policy disagreement. In 
response to my findings, Bloomberg Law and Westlaw have already corrected their citator reports for 
George Day. Also, Bloomberg Law confirmed to me that their “distinguished” labels are supposed to 
refer to the relationship between the citing case and the cited case. Letter from Darby J. Green, supra 
note 59.
 65. 223 F.3d 814 (8th Cir. 2000).
 66. 724 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1984).
 67. Burds, 223 F.3d at 817.
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treatment).68 I believe it would be better to label this as negative treatment, since it 
would certainly be negative for anyone in the Seventh or Eleventh Circuits. If Burds 
were the only citing reference to indicate that Amaro is not good law in the Seventh 
or Eleventh Circuits, users from those circuits might be disserved by Shepard’s 
neutral label.69 But it would be unfair to say that Shepard’s ACAN label is wrong, 
and it would work for users provided they were paying close attention.
¶43 A tougher puzzle is presented when a citing case notes a conflict, but 
decides to follow the cited case. For example, in De Pace v. Matsushita Electric Corp. 
of America,70 a U.S. District Court in New York cited Amaro and noted the same 
circuit split with the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, but sided with the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s view.71 Shepard’s labeled this as ACAN (neutral treatment), while KeyCite 
merely said that De Pace “discussed” Amaro. From the perspective of users in the 
Ninth or Second Circuits, De Pace appears to be positive treatment, but from the 
perspective of users in the Seventh or Eleventh Circuits, De Pace tells them that 
Amaro is not good law. Here, I think Shepard’s neutral label is best, but I see room 
for reasonable differences of opinion on whether this citing relationship should be 
marked as positive, neutral, or negative. (Neither KeyCite nor BCite has an appro-
priate neutral label that could be applied here.)
¶44 Citing references that Shepard’s labels as ACAN are difficult to compare to 
KeyCite and BCite. My solution was to include in my study all citing references that 
had the ACAN label, even though Shepard’s considers this to be neutral. (In this 
article, whenever I refer to relationships that are labeled as “negative,” that includes 
relationships that Shepard’s labeled as ACAN.) In situations like Burds, where the 
citing case did not decide whether to follow the cited case, I marked the ACAN 
label as correct, as well as the DR label from KeyCite. If a citator failed to apply a 
negative label in these situations, I counted this as a failure. In situations like De 
Pace where a citing case notes a conflict but follows the cited case, I marked the 
citing relationship as ambiguous, so that no citator is credited or penalized.
¶45 Negative citing references that appear in dissenting opinions also present 
some difficulties, as the three citators handle these types of citations differently. 
Shepard’s puts them in a neutral category called “cited in dissenting opinion” and 
never labels these citations as negative.72 But BCite and KeyCite apply negative 
labels to dissenting opinions in at least some situations. In my dataset, BCite labeled 
four citations from dissenting opinions as negative, and KeyCite labeled a fifth one 
as negative. As I stated earlier, I’m not judging the citators according to how well 
they follow their internal procedures, so it doesn’t matter for my purposes that 
Shepard’s withheld these negative labels according to a deliberate policy. If the 
negative treatment is clearly relevant to a typical user, it should be labeled as nega-
tive—I count anything less as a failure.
 68. BCite labeled this as positive with no descriptive phrase other than “cited in.”
 69. It’s not unusual for negative treatment to be a matter of perspective, and the citators generally 
label as negative any treatment that will be negative for some users, but not for others. For example, if 
the Eighth Circuit had expressly disagreed with Amaro, the treatment would obviously be labeled as 
negative, even though it presents no problem for users practicing in the Ninth Circuit.
 70. 257 F. Supp. 2d 543 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
 71. Id. at 557–60.
 72. Letter from Liz Christman, Senior Director of Case Law and Shepard’s Solutions, LexisNexis, 
to author (June 13, 2018) (on file with author).
464 LAW LIBRARY JOURNAL Vol. 110:4  [2018-20]
¶46 But is negative treatment clearly relevant if it comes from a dissenting opin-
ion? Not necessarily. If a U.S. Supreme Court majority opinion cites a Ninth Circuit 
case favorably, but the dissenting opinion criticizes the Ninth Circuit, I certainly 
wouldn’t mark a citator as wrong for listing the Supreme Court case as a positive 
reference. As any first-year law student knows, it’s the majority opinion that counts. 
But what if a dissenting opinion cites a case and points out that it has been treated 
negatively by another case? My dataset includes two examples of this. One is Enlow 
v. Salem-Keizer Yellow Cab Co.,73 a Ninth Circuit panel decision in which Judge 
Ferguson wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Fer-
guson cited a Ninth Circuit case, EEOC v. Borden’s, Inc., and noted that it had been 
overruled on other grounds by the U.S. Supreme Court.74 The majority opinion 
didn’t cite Borden’s. Users would certainly want to know that Borden’s has been 
overruled, regardless of who points out this fact.75 BCite handled this perfectly by 
describing the treatment as “prior overruling in” and labeling Enlow as a concur-
ring/dissenting opinion. The KeyCite and Shepard’s reports for Borden’s didn’t 
indicate any negative treatment from Enlow, which I counted as failures. To make 
matters worse, the Supreme Court case itself is incorrectly listed as a positive refer-
ence in the Shepard’s report for Borden’s. For Shepard’s, omitting the negative treat-
ment in Enlow compounded a critical mistake. Nothing in Borden’s Shepard’s 
report indicates that it was overruled by the Supreme Court.
¶47 I credited KeyCite for applying an “overruling recognized by” label to 
another dissenting opinion similar to Enlow, which BCite and Shepard’s failed to 
label as negative.76 The other three negative citations that BCite identified in dis-
senting opinions were distinguishing references. Some users might feel that distin-
guishing references in dissenting opinions are too insignificant to justify negative 
labels, but I tend to think that negative labels are useful here, provided that a citator 
follows BCite’s practice of clearly identifying the sources. Since I can see room for 
reasonable difference of opinion, I hesitate to mark KeyCite and Shepard’s as wrong 
for not labeling these references as negative. Instead, I marked these three citations 
as ambiguous.
Statistical Results
¶48 Before I started my independent analysis of the citators’ results, I could see 
a problem: the three citators are rarely in agreement. I looked at 357 citing relation-
ships that have at least one negative label from a citator. Out of these, all three cita-
tors agree that there was negative treatment only 53 times. This means that in 85% 
of these citing relationships, the three citators do not agree on whether there was 
negative treatment. Even when they all agree there was negative treatment, their 
 73. 371 F.3d 645 (9th Cir. 2004).
 74. Id. at 656 (citing EEOC v. Borden’s Inc., 724 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1984)).
 75. There might be some concern that the dissenting opinion mischaracterized the Supreme 
Court’s treatment of Borden’s, but that concern is present whenever the “overruling recognized by” 
label is applied. Citators aren’t designed to verify whether negative treatment is justified; they merely 
point it out so that the user may investigate further. In any case, Judge Ferguson was correct in point-
ing out that Borden’s had been overruled.
 76. United States v. Keene, 933 F.2d 711, 723 (9th Cir. 1991) (Alarcon, J., dissenting) (citing 
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. American Guar. Life Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 1498 (9th Cir. 1984)).
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descriptions often conflict. The three databases substantively agree on the type of 
negative treatment in only 40 of these citing relationships,77 which means that in 
this sample, they all agree with one another only 11% of the time. 
¶49 On the surface, even without any further examination, these numbers are 
troubling. They mean that at least one citator is making a lot of mistakes, or (viewed 
more charitably) that the citators are very likely to have differences of opinion. Even 
the latter explanation is worrisome, because all three citators present their results as 
fact—none of the citators labeled any of the citing relationships as ambiguous or open 
to interpretation. This means that when you citate a case that has negative treatment, 
the results you get depend mainly on which citator you happen to be using.
¶50 The results of my independent analysis are just as troubling. Out of 357 cit-
ing relationships that at least one of the citators marked as having negative treat-
ment, I found that 21 actually had no negative treatment and 27 were ambiguous, 
leaving 309 citing relationships in which there was clearly negative treatment. Out 
of these 309 negative citing relationships, Shepard’s failed to mark 85 (28%) as nega-
tive and applied incorrect descriptive phrases to another 18 (6%);78 overall, Shepa-
rd’s failed to correctly identify 103 (33%) of the negative references. KeyCite failed 
to mark 105 (34%) as negative and applied incorrect descriptive phrases to another 
11 (4%); overall, KeyCite failed to correctly identify 116 (38%) of the negative refer-
ences. BCite failed to mark 211 (68%) as negative and applied incorrect descriptive 
phrases to another 11 (4%); overall, BCite failed to correctly identify 222 (72%) of 
the negative references.
¶51 Most of the negative relationships that the citators missed were mislabeled, 
rather than omitted altogether. Of the 85 negative relationships that Shepard’s 
missed, 78 were mislabeled, while only 7 were omitted altogether. Of the 105 nega-
tive relationships that KeyCite missed, 99 were mislabeled, while only 6 were omit-
ted altogether. BCite had a more significant problem with omissions. Of the 211 
negative relationships that BCite missed, 178 were mislabeled, while 33 were omit-
ted altogether. All omissions in all three citators were unpublished cases, which 
 77. By “substantively agree,” I don’t mean that the descriptions were necessarily identical, only 
that there was no clear substantive difference. For example, if Shepard’s described a citation as “distin-
guished,” while KeyCite described it as “declined to extend,” I would consider them to be in substantial 
agreement.
 78. An incorrect descriptive label would be one that indicates the wrong type of negative treat-
ment. For example, a citing reference that is labeled “distinguished by” when it should say “overruled 
by.”
Table 1 
Citator Performance in Identifying 309 Negative Citing Relationships
 Relationships omitted  
or mislabeled as positive  
or neutral
Relationships labeled as 
negative, but incorrectly 
described
Overall failure to  
correctly identify
Shepard’s 85 (28%) 18 (6%) 103 (33%)
KeyCite 105 (34%) 11 (4%) 116 (38%)
BCite 211 (68%) 11 (4%) 222 (72%)
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would be less important to users.79 For all three citators, the significant problems 
occur in the editorial analysis process, after the initial process of identifying the 
citing cases.
¶52 I also calculated how accurately the three citators described the negative 
treatment that they did identify. Excluding the ambiguous references, Shepard’s 
listed 235 references as negative; of these, 11 (5%) were actually positive or neutral, 
while another 18 (8%) were negative but not correctly described. Overall, 12% of 
the negative labels in Shepard’s were incorrect. KeyCite listed 218 references as 
negative; of these, 14 (6%) were actually positive or neutral, while another 11 (5%) 
were negative but not correctly described. Overall, 11% of the negative labels in 
KeyCite were incorrect. BCite listed 102 references as negative; of these, 4 (4%) 
were actually positive or neutral, while another 11 (11%) were negative but not 
correctly described. Overall, 15% of the negative labels in BCite were incorrect.
¶53 The citators are much more likely to label a negative reference as positive 
than label a positive reference as negative. Unfortunately, the first type of situation 
is more serious, since it may lead users to cite invalid case law. Users can’t be 
expected to examine every citing reference for themselves. When they see a citing 
reference marked as positive, they’re not likely to investigate further. The second 
type of situation is more likely to be a mere inconvenience. A user who sees a false 
negative reference will probably investigate further and make their own judgment, 
or skip over the cited case and use another case.
¶54 As discussed earlier in this article, William L. Taylor’s comparison study 
rested on the assumption that no positive citing relationships were mislabeled as 
negative (an assumption for which he was much criticized).80 My results partly 
vindicate Taylor’s approach, and the performance rates I found for Shepard’s and 
KeyCite are fairly close to what Taylor found. I found that Shepard’s missed 28% of 
the negative references, compared to Taylor’s 23%. I found that KeyCite missed 
34% of the negative references, compared to Taylor’s 25%. The different perfor-
mance rates I found are due in part to my comparison with a third citator, as BCite 
sometimes spotted negative treatment that both Shepard’s and KeyCite missed. 
Other explanations for the difference in my results include the larger sample size 
 79. A citator could have omitted a citing case for one of two reasons: (i) the citing case wasn’t in 
the database or (ii) the citator failed to spot the citation in the text of the citing case. I didn’t deter-
mine which of these two reasons explain each omission, but the fact that all the omissions involve 
unpublished cases suggests that the first reason explains most of the omissions.
 80. See supra ¶¶ 8–11.
Table 2
Incorrect Negative Labels
 Relationships  
labeled as negative
Relationships that 
were actually  
positive or neutral
Relationships that 
were negative, but 
incorrectly described
Total incorrect  
negative labels
Shepard’s 235 11 (5%) 18 (8%) 29 (12%)
KeyCite 218 14 (6%) 11 (5%) 25 (11%)
BCite 102 4 (4%) 11 (11%) 15 (15%)
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in this study, and the much broader time frame covered here. This study examines 
citing relationships dating from 1984 to 2017, compared to Taylor’s much narrower 
time frame of 1997 to 1999.81
¶55 Neither Taylor’s study nor mine is designed to catch all failures in identify-
ing negative treatment. Because I looked only at citing relationships that at least one 
of the three citators labeled as negative, I would not have caught any negative treat-
ment that all three citators missed. Given the citators’ poor overall performance, it’s 
likely that many negative references were missed by all three.82 The performance 
rates presented here may underestimate the extent of the problem.
¶56 Although my statistics suggest that BCite underperforms in case validation 
as compared to Shepard’s and KeyCite, readers should keep in mind that these sta-
tistics treat all failures as equal. The reality is more complex, as discussed in the next 
section.
Examples of Citator Errors
¶57 The statistics tell only part of the story, since not all citator errors are of 
equal importance. Some are trivial. If a citator misses a brief distinguishing refer-
ence from an unpublished trial court case, users are not likely to suffer any harm. 
Moreover, a citator might reasonably focus its limited resources on labeling the 
more significant references, at the expense of less important ones. But the mistakes 
I found are not necessarily trivial. Most were significant, and some were astonish-
ing. In this section of the article, I describe some of the most blatant and potentially 
harmful mistakes.83
¶58 Perhaps no form of negative treatment is more important than an overrul-
ing from the U.S. Supreme Court. In my dataset, there are four of these overrulings, 
all directed at published opinions of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Incredibly, 
Shepard’s mislabeled three of them, while KeyCite mislabeled two and BCite misla-
beled one. These four citing relationships are obviously not a statistically valid 
sample size, but the point is that serious mistakes of this kind should be exceedingly 
rare. The fact that Shepard’s mislabeled three out of four Supreme Court overrul-
ings is evidence enough of a serious problem. Each of these mistakes is worth dis-
cussing in detail.
¶59 First, in Public Employees Retirement Systems of Ohio v. Betts, the Supreme 
Court construed a section of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act that 
exempts certain age-based employee benefit plans.84 At one point in the opinion, 
the Court considered whether the exemption should be limited to plans that have a 
cost justification for age-based differentials, a position that had been urged by the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The Court acknowledged 
two Ninth Circuit cases that had recognized the cost justification requirement, 
 81. Taylor, supra note 16, at 129, ¶ 8. It seems plausible that the citators have had some ups and 
downs in their performance rates over the years, but from the user’s perspective, it’s their cumulative 
performance that counts.
 82. One such failure came to light during my review. See infra ¶ 65.
 83. Because the database providers have already made changes to their citator reports in response 
to a draft of this article, the errors discussed here may no longer exist online. The errors are drawn 
from the citator reports I downloaded in 2017.
 84. 492 U.S. 158 (1989) (construing 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)).
468 LAW LIBRARY JOURNAL Vol. 110:4  [2018-20]
including EEOC v. Borden’s.85 In the next three paragraphs, the Court attacked the 
position taken by the EEOC and the Ninth Circuit. The Court wrote that “[t]here 
are a number of difficulties with this explanation for the cost-justification require-
ment,” and said the EEOC’s position was “quite difficult to believe.”86 The Court 
further wrote that the EEOC’s position was “weakened further” by regulatory 
authority, and finally concluded that the “cost-justification requirement is contrary 
to the plain language of the statute and is invalid.”87 The Supreme Court’s rejection 
of the Borden’s holding is perfectly clear. KeyCite labeled Betts as disagreeing with 
Borden’s, and BCite labeled it (more appropriately) as overruling Borden’s.88 But the 
Shepard’s report for Borden’s inexplicably labeled Betts as “cited by,” indicating no 
negative treatment whatsoever from Betts.
¶60 Following the Betts decision, at least eight published federal court opinions 
have explicitly stated that Betts overruled Borden’s.89 KeyCite or BCite acknowl-
edged these statements with the “overruling recognized by” or “prior overruling in” 
label, but the Shepard’s report for Borden’s doesn’t clearly acknowledge any of these 
statements. The best that Shepard’s could manage was to say that Borden’s had been 
“questioned” by only two other courts. The incorrect Shepard’s report for Borden’s 
resulted not just from a single mistake, but from a series of failures.
¶61 Next, in Peacock v. Thomas, the Supreme Court resolved a circuit split 
about ancillary jurisdiction involving the Ninth Circuit’s Blackburn Truck Lines, 
Inc. v. Francis.90 At the outset of its opinion, the Supreme Court said it had granted 
certiorari “to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals.”91 In a footnote at the 
end of this sentence, the Court cited Blackburn and cases from the Third and Sev-
enth Circuits as being aligned with the Fourth Circuit case under review, in opposi-
tion to cases from the Fifth and Tenth Circuits.92 The Supreme Court reversed the 
Fourth Circuit.93 Although the Court did not cite Blackburn again, the effect on 
Blackburn is clear. The Supreme Court declared that it was resolving a circuit split 
involving Blackburn, and Blackburn wound up on the losing side. BCite correctly 
labeled Peacock as overruling Blackburn, but Shepard’s and KeyCite both fell short. 
Shepard’s described Peacock’s treatment of Blackburn as “validity questioned by,” 
and KeyCite described it as “called into doubt by.”94 Shepard’s and KeyCite’s deci-
 85. Id. at 173 (citing EEOC v. Borden’s, 724 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1984)).
 86. Id. at 173–74.
 87. Id. at 174–75.
 88. I marked both KeyCite and BCite as correct, although KeyCite’s label is less than ideal. Betts 
did more than just “disagree” with Borden’s; it invalidated part of Borden’s. KeyCite’s label was on the 
borderline of what I consider to be reasonably correct.
 89. Enlow v. Salem-Keizer Yellow Cab. Co., 371 F.3d 645, 656 (9th Cir. 2004) (Ferguson, J., dis-
senting); Cooney v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 258 F.3d 731, 734–35, 735 n.2 (8th Cir. 2001); Johnson v. 
New York, 49 F.3d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 1995); Rebar v. Marsh, 959 F.2d 216, 218 n.5 (11th Cir. 1992); AARP 
v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 943 F.2d 996, 1004 (9th Cir. 1991); Mitchell v. Mobil Oil Corp., 896 F.2d 463, 470 
(10th Cir. 1990); EEOC v. Newport Mesa Unified Sch. Dist., 893 F. Supp. 927, 930 (C.D. Cal. 1995); 
EEOC v. California Micro Devices Corp., 869 F. Supp. 767, 771–72 (D. Ariz. 1994).
 90. 516 U.S. 349 (1996) (citing Blackburn Truck Lines, Inc. v. Francis, 723 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 
1984)).
 91. Id. at 352.
 92. Id. at 352 n.2.
 93. Id. at 360.
 94. I gave Shepard’s and KeyCite credit for correctly identifying Peacock as a negative reference, 
but I marked their descriptive phrases as incorrect.
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sion to use these weaker descriptive phrases means that both citators display only 
yellow or orange warning signs for Blackburn, as opposed to the red warning signs 
that should have been displayed.95 Curiously, both Shepard’s and KeyCite noted that 
other cases had acknowledged Peacock’s invalidation of Blackburn, but apparently 
this didn’t prompt anyone at Shepard’s or KeyCite to reconsider their description of 
Peacock itself. In the KeyCite report for Blackburn, two published opinions from 
U.S. Courts of Appeals are labeled as “abrogation recognized by,” and they were 
both referring to Peacock’s abrogation of Blackburn.96 Shepard’s marked one of 
these as “validity questioned by,” but failed to identify any negative treatment in the 
other.97 But Shepard’s did say that Blackburn was “overruled in part as stated in” an 
unpublished U.S. District Court case, which again was referring to Peacock’s over-
ruling of Blackburn.98
¶62 KeyCite’s initial description of Blackburn’s overruling led to an even worse 
mistake in Blackburn’s KeyCite report. KeyCite has a “most negative” highlighting 
feature designed to highlight the single most negative citing case in a KeyCite 
report. The “most negative” case is listed first on the “Negative Treatment” tab, 
where it receives a prominent red label; it also appears directly on the “Document” 
tab where users view the full text of Blackburn.99 According to KeyCite, Blackburn’s 
most negative treatment came from the Fourth Circuit in Thomas v. Peacock,100 the 
very same case that the Supreme Court grouped with Blackburn and reversed. 
Although Blackburn is on the losing side of a circuit split resolved by the Supreme 
Court, KeyCite directs its users’ focus away from the Supreme Court ruling to high-
light some negative treatment from a circuit on the same side as Blackburn.101 It’s 
easy to imagine a busy lawyer who looks only at the “most negative” case, sees that 
it isn’t very serious, and decides to rely on Blackburn without pulling up the rest of 
the KeyCite report.
¶63 The last in this trio of Supreme Court cases is Republic National Bank of 
Miami v. United States,102 which also resolved a circuit split against a Ninth Circuit 
case. In Republic National Bank, the treatment was not as clear as it had been in 
Peacock, because of small differences in the Supreme Court’s phrasing. The Court 
 95. Shepard’s displayed an orange “Q” sign for Blackburn as opposed to a red stop sign; KeyCite 
displayed a yellow flag as opposed to a red flag.
 96. Ellis v. All Steel Constr., Inc., 389 F.3d 1031, 1035 (10th Cir. 2004); Futura Dev. of P.R., Inc. v. 
Puerto Rico, 144 F.3d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 1998).
 97. Shepard’s described the negative treatment in Futura Development as “validity questioned 
by,” even though Futura made it clear that the Supreme Court had ruled against Blackburn. I gave 
Shepard’s credit for identifying Futura as a negative reference, but marked its descriptive phrase as 
incorrect. BCite failed to identify either Ellis or Futura as negative treatment for Blackburn.
 98. 21st Century Fin. Servs., LLC v. Manchester Fin. Bank, No. 15-cv-1848 BTM (BGS), 2016 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66822, at *4 n.1 (S.D. Cal. May 19, 2016). KeyCite and BCite also correctly labeled 
this case. Note the discrepancy between Shepard’s correct description of 21st Century Financial (“over-
ruled in part as stated in”) and its incorrect description of Futura Development (“validity questioned 
by”).
 99. For a description of KeyCite’s “most negative” feature, see Ellenberg, supra note 44.
 100. 39 F.3d 493 (4th Cir. 1994).
 101. KeyCite was correct to point out that the Fourth Circuit disagreed with part of Black-
burn, but it’s absurd to suggest that this is more serious than an overruling by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
I didn’t count the “most negative” label as a separate error in my statistical comparison (see supra note 
44), but it does help to illustrate why KeyCite’s description of Peacock is wrong. Users need accurate 
descriptive labels so they can see the relative importance of different citing relationships.
 102. 506 U.S. 80 (1992).
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in Republic National Bank considered the limits of in rem jurisdiction, and said it 
granted certiorari “[i]n view of inconsistency and apparent uncertainty among the 
Courts of Appeals.”103 Although this sentence could have been clearer, I interpret it 
to mean that the Supreme Court is resolving a circuit split. The Court is hedging 
somewhat with the word “apparent,” but note that this word qualifies “uncertainty,” 
not “inconsistency.” A footnote in this sentence gives examples of the circuit split, 
but it doesn’t separate the cases as neatly as the Court did in Peacock. Here’s the text 
of the footnote, in its entirety:
Compare United States v. One Lot of $25,721.00 in Currency, 938 F.2d 1417 (CA1 1991); 
United States v. Aiello, 912 F.2d 4 (CA2 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048 (1991); United 
States v. $95,945.18, United States Currency, 913 F.2d 1106 (CA4 1990), with United States 
v. Cadillac Sedan Deville, 1983, 933 F.2d 1010 (CA6 1991) (appeal dism’d); United States v. 
Tit’s Cocktail Lounge, 873 F.2d 141 (CA7 1989); United States v. $29,959.00 U. S. Currency, 
931 F.2d 549 (CA9 1991); and the Court of Appeals’ opinion in the present case. Compare 
also United States v. $57,480.05 United States Currency and Other Coins, 722 F.2d 1457 (CA9 
1984), with United States v. Aiello, 912 F.2d at 7, and United States v. $95,945.18, United 
States Currency, 913 F.2d at 1110, n. 4.104
¶64 The Supreme Court reversed. The question for this study is how the Court 
treated the Ninth Circuit’s $57,480.05 United States Currency and Other Coins,105 
which it cited only in this footnote. The wording in the footnote requires some 
thought, but in the end its meaning is clear. In the first sentence, Aiello and 
$95,945.18 are contrasted with the “Court of Appeals’ opinion in the present case.” 
In the second sentence, $57,480.05 is contrasted with Aiello and $95,945.18. This 
places $57,480.05 on the same side as the case under direct review, which was 
reversed. This interpretation can be confirmed by comparing the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding in $57,480.05 with the Supreme Court’s holding in Republic National 
Bank.106 The Ninth Circuit held that federal courts lose jurisdiction over in rem 
cases if they lose control over the in rem currency, and further held that if in rem 
currency is transferred to the United States Treasury, federal courts have no power 
to order the Treasury to return it.107 In Republic National Bank, the Supreme Court 
rejected both aspects of this rule. The Supreme Court held that federal courts do 
not need continuing control over in rem currency to retain in rem jurisdiction,108 
and further held that courts can order the Treasury to return in rem currency.109 
The treatment in Republic National Bank is a good example of something that’s easy 
to overlook, but not ambiguous after close examination. Catching it requires a 
sharp eye. Shepard’s and BCite failed to identify any negative treatment from 
Republic National Bank in their reports for $57,480.05; KeyCite’s report for 
 103. Id. at 84.
 104. Id. at 84 n.3.
 105. 722 F.2d 1457 (9th Cir. 1984).
 106. Ordinarily, I expect the citators to make a judgment based only on the text of the cit-
ing case, without consulting the text of the cited case. If the text of the citing case doesn’t reveal any 
negative treatment, I don’t expect citators to independently consider conflicts between the two cases. 
But here, the text in Republic National is certainly enough to signal negative treatment; a comparison 
of the two cases merely confirms how the treatment should be described.
 107. $57,480.05 United States Currency, 722 F.2d at 1458–59.
 108. Republic National Bank, 506 U.S. at 84–85.
 109. Id. at 95–96 (opinion of Rehnquist, J.).
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$57,480.05 came closer by labeling Republic National Bank as “called into doubt 
by.”110
¶65 The three Supreme Court cases discussed above are part of my dataset, 
because each of them was labeled as a negative reference by at least one citator. Dur-
ing my review, I discovered yet another mishandled Supreme Court case that should 
be part of my dataset. In Alexander v. Sandoval,111 the Supreme Court rejected a 
holding in Larry P. v. Riles,112 one of the Ninth Circuit cases that I used as a starting 
point for this study. All three citators included Alexander as a citing case for Larry 
P.; the reason why Alexander doesn’t appear in my dataset is that none of the three 
citators labeled Alexander as a negative reference. The majority opinion in Alexan-
der didn’t cite Larry P., but Justice Stevens, in a dissent joined by three other justices, 
cited Larry P. as an example of a case that the majority was rejecting.113 Alexander 
illustrates why citations in dissenting opinions need to be analyzed.114 Any lawyer 
evaluating Larry P.’s validity would want to know about Justice Stevens’ citation. 
After Alexander was decided, it took twelve years for another court to cite Larry P. 
and point out that it had been invalidated by the Supreme Court.115 Shepard’s and 
KeyCite appropriately labeled this other case, but BCite missed it.116 Nothing else 
in the citator reports indicates that Larry P. is inconsistent with Supreme Court 
precedent.
¶66 En banc decisions in U.S. Courts of Appeals that reverse prior panel deci-
sions are another critically important form of negative treatment. In Wallace v. 
Christensen,117 the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc reviewed a decision of the United 
States Parole Commission. As the court explained, “[p]revious cases in this circuit 
have referred to an ‘abuse of discretion’ standard as the basis for review of Commis-
sion decisions, and have implicitly assumed the existence of jurisdiction to conduct 
that analysis.”118 Immediately after this sentence, the court cited several Ninth Cir-
cuit panel decisions, including Roth v. U.S. Parole Commission119 and Torres-Macias 
v. U.S. Parole Commission.120 The court said that it “took this case en banc to recon-
sider this assumption and evaluate our standard of review.”121 The court disagreed 
with its prior rulings, and held that federal courts have no power to review the 
Commission’s use of discretion even under an abuse of discretion standard, but that 
courts may consider whether the Commission has acted outside its statutory 
authority or violated the Constitution.122 So far, the court’s treatment of Roth and 
Torres-Macias is similar to the Supreme Court’s treatment of Blackburn and 
$57,480.05. The court announced that it was reviewing a holding from prior cases 
 110. I gave KeyCite credit for recognizing Republic National Bank as a negative reference, 
but I marked its descriptive phrase as incorrect.
 111. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
 112. 793 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1984).
 113. Alexander, 532 U.S. at 295–96 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
 114. For further discussion of negative treatment in dissenting opinions, see supra ¶¶ 45–47.
 115. Landegger v. Cohen, 5 F. Supp. 3d 1278, 1288 n.12 (D. Colo. 2013).
 116. In their reports for Larry P., Shepard’s labeled Landegger as “abrogated in part as stated 
in,” KeyCite labeled it as “abrogation recognized by,” and BCite labeled it as a positive reference.
 117. 802 F.2d 1539 (9th Cir. 1986).
 118. Id. at 1542.
 119. 724 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1984).
 120. 730 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1984).
 121. Wallace, 802 F.2d at 1542.
 122. Id. at 1550–52.
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cited by name, then declared a rule of law that conflicts with the holding in those 
prior decisions. Readers who are more sympathetic to the citators might feel that 
this sort of treatment just isn’t clear enough: they may feel that the reviewing court 
needs to connect the overruling more directly to the cited cases. In Wallace, the 
court did just that. At the end of its opinion, it said: “We overrule our previous 
decisions only to the extent that we have held that Commission decisions granting 
or denying parole are subject to judicial review for an abuse of discretion.”123 This 
was followed by a footnote citing cases including Roth and Torres-Macias.124 In the 
reports for Roth and Torres-Macias, Shepard’s and KeyCite correctly labeled Wal-
lace as an overruling case, but BCite labeled Wallace as a positive case.
¶67 Most of the citing relationships I studied are less important than the ones 
discussed so far. But some of these relatively unimportant relationships involve 
especially blatant mistakes that cast further doubt on the citators’ overall quality 
control. For example, in In re Di Noto, the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate 
Panel spent three paragraphs and a footnote discussing In re Comer, referring to it 
by name six times.125 The Panel distinguished Comer in three different ways, writ-
ing that “Comer is not applicable to our case,”126 then in the next paragraph writing 
“a second reason for distinguishing Comer . . . ,”127 and then in a footnote writing 
“there is also a third possible basis for distinguishing Comer.”128 Although Shepa-
rd’s and BCite correctly labeled In re Di Noto as a distinguishing reference, KeyCite 
somehow failed to identify any negative treatment here.
¶68 In another mistake equally strange but going in the other direction, Shepa-
rd’s indicated that In re Peterson129 distinguished United States v. Zolla.130 In fact, 
Peterson didn’t cite Zolla at all.131
¶69 In Roldan v. Rocette, the Second Circuit spent over a full page in the Federal 
Reporter heaping criticism on a line of Ninth Circuit cases, including Thorsteinsson 
v. INS.132 Thorsteinsson came in for particular scorn, with the Second Circuit writ-
ing that “[t]he critical flaw in the Mendez rule is especially evident in Thorsteins-
son,” followed by a full paragraph explaining why.133 Despite this and three other 
citing cases that clearly gave Thorsteinsson negative treatment,134 BCite gave Thor-
 123. Id. at 1554.
 124. Id. at 1554 n.10.
 125. In re Di Noto, 46 B.R. 489, 491 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1984) (citing In re Comer, 723 F.2d 737 
(9th Cir. 1984)).
 126. Id. at 491.
 127. Id.
 128. Id. at 491 n.1.
 129. 152 B.R. 329 (D. Wyo. 1993).
 130. 724 F.2d 808 (9th Cir. 1984).
 131. KeyCite and BCite didn’t include Peterson as a citing case for Zolla, so I marked Key-
Cite and BCite as correct.
 132. Roldan v. Rocette, 984 F.2d 85, 89–90 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Thorsteinsson v. INS, 724 
F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1984)).
 133. Id. at 90.
 134. The three other cases are Santiago-Rodriguez v. Holder, 657 F.3d 820, 831–33 (9th Cir. 
2011) (distinguishing Thorsteinsson), Baez v. INS, 41 F.3d 19, 22–23 (1st Cir. 1994) (rejecting the 
Ninth Circuit’s Mendez line of cases, including Thorsteinsson), and Arreaza-Cruz v. INS, 39 F.3d 909, 
912 (9th Cir. 1994) (distinguishing Thorsteinsson).
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steinsson a green plus sign indicating that Thorsteinsson hadn’t received negative 
treatment from any case.135
¶70 BCite also bungled the report for United States v. Beckett,136 which was dis-
cussed at length, featured in a block quotation, and rejected by the Eleventh Circuit 
in United States v. Stone,137 and rejected another time by the Sixth Circuit in United 
States v. Mari with language including “we register our disagreement with the Ninth 
Circuit,” and “[Beckett] is contrary to the Supreme Court’s later decision . . . as well 
as illogical.”138 BCite missed the negative treatment in Stone and Mari, and man-
aged to identify only one of two other cases that distinguished Beckett.139
¶71 I counted a total of 470 failures in the citators’ validation of seventy-three 
Ninth Circuit cases. These failures can’t be readily dismissed as insignificant. 
Although some failures are trivial, others are harmful; and while some failures are 
hard to see, others are blatant. The bottom line is that users can make no safe 
assumptions about what their citators will do for them.
Responses from the Database Providers
¶72 Thomson Reuters (publisher of Westlaw), LexisNexis, and Bloomberg Law 
reviewed a draft version of this article and my dataset prior to publication. All three 
companies offered some comments, and LexisNexis and Bloomberg Law also pro-
vided lists of citing references they disputed.140 In response, I made some revisions 
to the text and agreed to recode four citing references,141 but many disagreements 
remained.
¶73 Thomson Reuters conceded that I had identified some incorrect determi-
nations in KeyCite, but said they disagreed with most of my results and conclusions. 
They did not provide examples. They wrote that the “complex nature of legal 
research, and analyzing judicial opinions specifically, does not lend itself to an 
‘objectively correct’ interpretation,” and claimed that most of their labels involve 
“subjective determinations.”142 They further wrote that “Thomson Reuters stands 
behind KeyCite. It is the most complete, accurate and up to the minute citator avail-
able in the market.”143
¶74 LexisNexis and Bloomberg Law offered more specific comments. They both 
protested that I sometimes marked as incorrect citing references that had been 
 135. KeyCite correctly identified all of Thorsteinsson’s negative treatment, and Shepard’s 
correctly identified all but Santiago-Rodriguez.
 136. 724 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1984).
 137. 9 F.3d 934, 940 (11th Cir. 1993).
 138. 47 F.3d 782, 787 (6th Cir. 1995).
 139. The distinguishing reference that BCite identified was from United States v. Defazio, 
899 F.2d 626, 636 (7th Cir. 1990). The distinguishing reference that BCite missed was from United 
States v. Mang Sun Wong, 884 F.2d 1537, 1542–43 (2d Cir. 1989). Shepard’s and KeyCite correctly 
identified all the negative treatment for Beckett.
 140. All correspondence is on file with the author. Lexis listed forty citing references in 
dispute, while Bloomberg Law listed twenty-nine.
 141. I agreed to recode as ambiguous three citing references that were somewhat unclear, 
and for another citing reference I agreed to credit BCite instead of Shepard’s and KeyCite due to a 
reading error on my part. 
 142. Letter from Leann Blanchfield, Vice President for Product Development, Thomson 
Reuters, to author (June 10, 2018) (on file with author). 
 143. Id.
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handled correctly according to their own internal procedures. Naturally, the results 
presented here would be more favorable to all three citators if I judged each citator 
according to its own procedures, but as I explained previously, I judge the citators 
according to their end results from the perspective of a typical user.
¶75 Bloomberg Law’s key objection not only challenges my methodology, but 
perhaps questions the overall relevance of this article. As noted earlier, BCite uses 
a relatively short list of negative labels.144 For many types of negative treatment 
(such as “called into doubt” or “disagreement recognized by”), BCite simply has no 
label that can be applied. This issue accounts for roughly one-fifth of the missing 
negative labels I counted in BCite. In their comments to me, Bloomberg Law 
insisted that this design feature is not a weakness and should not have been 
counted against them. They explained that they made a deliberate decision to use 
a short list of negative labels in response to market research showing that most 
users don’t want as many negative labels as Shepard’s and KeyCite offer.145 Some 
users may agree with Bloomberg’s decision, but in any case it’s important for users 
to be aware of this significant difference between the citators.146
¶76 LexisNexis defended Shepard’s policy of withholding negative labels from 
what it calls “citing convention negatives.” An example explains the general idea. In 
AARP v. Farmers Group, Inc., the Ninth Circuit briefly cited one of its earlier deci-
sions as follows: “Cf. E.E.O.C. v. Borden’s Inc., 724 F.2d 1390, 1396–97 (9th 
Cir.1984), overruled on other grounds, Betts, 492 U.S. at 173–75.”147 In its report for 
Borden’s, Shepard’s did not apply an “overruled as stated in” label to AARP because 
its negative treatment of Borden’s can be attributed to a “citing convention.” I was 
unable to determine how Shepard’s defines a “citing convention,” but the idea is 
that these citing convention negatives are too inconsequential to note.148 According 
to LexisNexis, this policy accounts for twelve of the missing labels I counted in 
Shepard’s.149 I decided not to exclude these missing labels from my statistics. After 
receiving LexisNexis’s explanation and viewing many examples, I still don’t fully 
understand how Shepard’s applies this policy, so I don’t believe it would be clear to 
the typical user. Moreover, these “citing convention negatives” are not necessarily 
 144. See supra ¶ 37.
 145. Letter from Darby J. Green, supra note 59. In my view, a truncated list of negative 
labels is not an improvement. I realize that users are often uninterested in certain types of nega-
tive labels, but in KeyCite and Shepard’s they can choose to focus on whatever labels they feel are 
important. If some users find KeyCite and Shepard’s confusing, BCite could have offered improved 
customization so that individual users could easily choose the level of detail they prefer.
 146. BCite’s more limited approach is not immediately clear to the user. Although Bloom-
berg publishes a complete list of its BCite labels, it doesn’t indicate that the list is complete. On the 
contrary, it presents the list as “a description of the main components,” which suggests there may be 
additional components not listed. Bloomberg Law Citator, supra note 48. Knowing that Westlaw and 
Lexis publish similar lists of citator labels that are not complete, I assumed at first that BCite’s list was 
not complete. Moreover, a typical user is not likely to compare the lists from the different citators, 
determine what’s missing from BCite, and realize how this impacts the validation process.
 147. 943 F.2d 996, 1004 (9th Cir. 1991).
 148. As LexisNexis explains, “our policy is based on the rationale that including citing con-
vention references artificially inflates negative citing references and results in researchers having to go 
check cases to review these allegedly negative references unnecessarily.” Letter from Liz Christman, 
supra note 72.
 149. Id. I can’t verify that number since I don’t understand the boundaries of the policy.
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inconsequential. I have already discussed the serious deficiencies in the Shepard’s 
report for Borden’s,150 and the missing label for AARP is part of the problem.151
¶77 LexisNexis also pointed out its policy of withholding editorial analysis 
labels from citing references in unpublished California Court of Appeal deci-
sions.152 This accounts for five of the missing negative labels I counted in Shepa-
rd’s.153 According to LexisNexis, the rationale for its policy “is that California fol-
lows a strict rule of not citing unpublished opinions as precedential authority.”154 
Again, I decided not to exclude these missing labels from my statistics. From the 
user’s perspective, Shepard’s policy looks like a mistake. For example, in its report 
for Javor v. United States,155 Shepard’s lists seven citing references from unpublished 
California Court of Appeal cases. These look like any other citing cases in a Shepa-
rd’s report. All seven have a blue square with a “cited by” label (which indicates no 
negative treatment), but a user who views these cases would discover that at least 
three of them are in fact negative. Of course, these are minor problems since these 
citing cases are of little importance,156 but I don’t separate major and minor prob-
lems in my statistics.
¶78 Finally, there were additional, specific citing references that Bloomberg Law 
and/or LexisNexis argued were simply ambiguous. Deciding which citing refer-
ences to code as ambiguous is perhaps the most subjective part of this study, but 
lines must be drawn somewhere. Some of the references we disagreed on were 
admittedly close to the line,157 while many others struck me as perfectly clear.158 I 
admit that different researchers might choose to code somewhat more or somewhat 
 150. Supra ¶¶ 46, 59–60.
 151. When a citing convention negative notes an express overruling, the information is 
usually redundant. But redundancy can be a good way of mitigating errors like the one that occurred 
in Borden’s Shepard’s report. In other situations, citing convention negatives might point out implicit 
overrulings that would not otherwise be noted in a citator report.
 152. E-mail from Liz Christman to author (June 13, 2018, 18:34 EST) (on file with author).
 153. A sixth unpublished California Court of Appeal decision was omitted altogether from 
a Shepard’s report.
 154. E-mail from Liz Christman, supra note 152.
 155. 724 F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1984).
 156. These citing cases are unimportant, but not irrelevant. In this study, the typical user is 
assessing the validity of published Ninth Circuit cases. The question is whether the Ninth Circuit cases 
should be cited, not whether any unpublished California cases should be cited. Viewed in this context, 
unpublished California cases should have the same, limited relevance as any other unpublished cases.
 157. For example, Sheley v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1420 (11th Cir. 1987), cited two cases called 
Toussaint. First, it cited Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1986), which is not part of my 
dataset. Sheley, 833 F.2d at 1425. Sheley referred to this case with the shorthand reference “Toussaint” 
and clearly distinguished it. Id. at 1426–27. Immediately after this discussion, Sheley cited Toussaint v. 
Yockey, 722 F.2d 1490 (9th Cir. 1984), which is part of my dataset. Id. at 1427. Although most readers 
would infer that the two Toussaints are related cases, Sheley doesn’t say this explicitly. KeyCite and 
Shepard’s noted no distinguishing treatment here for Toussaint v. Yockey, but BCite did. I marked 
BCite as incorrect. I thought it was clear enough that the two Toussaints should not be treated as one 
and the same, but some readers might see ambiguity here.
 158. For example, almost the entire opinion in Berryman v. Wong, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
9910 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2010), was about the applicability of  Javor v. United States, 724 F.2d 831 
(9th Cir. 1984). The court extensively discussed the factual differences between the two cases and 
concluded that “[t]he presumed prejudice standard under Javor does not apply.” Berryman, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS, at *18. Shepard’s and BCite failed to apply a “distinguished” label here, which LexisNexis 
argued was just a “judgment call.” Letter from Liz Christman, supra note 72. Bloomberg Law did not 
dispute this reference.
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fewer citing references as ambiguous, but I doubt these differences would result in 
much change to the overall outcome.
Conclusion
¶79 This study evaluates one key aspect of legal citators: their performance in 
flagging negative citing references. Other important aspects such as currency, over-
all retrieval of citing references, labeling of positive references, ease of use, cus-
tomer satisfaction, and cost are not covered here. This study is not an assessment 
of any citator’s overall merit. I do not claim that any citator is “best” or “worst.”
¶80 I strove to make this study as fair and objective as possible, but any evalu-
ation of the citators’ case validation performance will rest partly on personal opin-
ion. I’ve mitigated the role of personal opinion by attempting to exclude ambiguous 
citing relationships from my statistics, disclosing my methodology, offering many 
examples of what I consider to be errors, and giving the benefit of the doubt to the 
citators on close questions. Some readers may remain unconvinced. But it’s not 
only my own judgment that conflicts with the citators—for almost 90% of the nega-
tive labels reviewed here, at least one citator conflicts with another.159 If these dis-
crepancies can’t be objectively resolved, then the citators themselves are based on 
nothing more than idiosyncratic opinion. If true, this would undermine the cita-
tors’ usefulness. The citators can be reliable or they can be idiosyncratic, but they 
can’t be both.
¶81 I believe that most citing relationships are clear and can be objectively 
described, that labels in citators can be right or wrong, and that all three citators 
can and should do better. I don’t expect perfection. But surely there is room for 
improvement, especially in the most important citing relationships, such as cita-
tions from the U.S. Supreme Court. In the meantime, users may need to reconsider 
the trust they place in citators, and law librarians may need to rethink how they 
discuss citators with their patrons. Citators will always be an essential part of the 
legal research process, but researchers need to be aware of the citators’ shortcom-
ings. Relying only on a citator’s treatment symbols is a risky strategy for case 
validation.
 159. See supra ¶ 48.
